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Free Movement Emancipates, but What  
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Vesco Paskalev
I must start my response to Floris de Witte with a personal note – I am a 
Bulgarian national, living and working in Britain. As such, I am strongly 
attracted by his argument that sees free movement as the core of EU citizen-
ship aimed at extending individual liberties. Indeed, my moving away from 
Bulgaria was an act of emancipation from the perennially corrupt and 
increasingly fascist country where I was born. Contrary to what Daniel 
Thym and Richard Bellamy argue, the Member States, while nominally 
democratic, do differ in their respect for fundamental rights of their citizens, 
and the professed ambitions of the current Hungarian prime minister to 
build an illiberal state does not seem to suggest that convergence towards 
the highest democratic standards is forthcoming.
Indeed, freedom of movement is emancipatory in a number of senses. On 
a conceptual level, EU citizenship liberates everyone: for centuries contrac-
tarian theories have claimed that people who do not leave their country of 
residence can be seen as consenting to its authority. While until recently the 
exit option has been only putative, now EU citizenship allows us to conceive 
those who stay as accepting state authority voluntarily. Certainly, EU citi-
zenship should be the dream of libertarians – in a marketplace of govern-
ments you can shop around and chose the one which is freer, or perhaps the 
one which is best tailored to your personal taste. EU citizenship is emanci-
patory also in pragmatic terms (one may call this argument neoliberal) – the 
fear of possible mass exit of citizens (a.k.a. workforce, taxpayers, elector-
ate) may deter governments from abusing them. All in all, if we equate free-
dom with individual pursuit of happiness in a social context that is taken for 
granted, it is difficult to argue against De Witte. However, it is not so on a 
more robust, Arendtian understanding of freedom as equal participation in a 
self-governing community, which free movement tends to erode.
Certainly, De Witte (and all of the previous contributors) do not under-
stand freedom negatively. Indeed free movement may promote certain posi-
tive aspects of freedom. For example, De Witte correctly argues that free 
movement ‘liberates not only the body but also the mind from the normative 
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structures of the state.’ The Brexit referendum provides a wonderful empiri-
cal confirmation of this point. Opinion polls suggest that while older Britons 
are clinging on antiquated ideas about sovereignty, the younger generation – 
born as EU citizens and in conditions of widespread mobility – are very 
much at ease with joint decision-making and are more likely to see the 
Union as empowering rather than crippling their own country.1 There is no 
similar evidence for the attitudes of older Britons living in Europe, but it is 
plausible to expect some similarity between the views of the people who 
actually move and of those who are born with the right to.2 There is ‘reflex-
ive virtue’ to be gained from free movement indeed.
Such collateral benefits of free movement notwithstanding, civic virtue is 
ill served by free movement and it is hardly surprising that Richard Bellamy 
disagrees with De Witte. On republican accounts citizenship is relational 
and European mobility by definition loosens the link between citizens and 
their state. Even in the age of Ryanair and Skype the opportunities of the 
external citizens to participate in the democratic life of their home state are 
significantly reduced. Indeed, in most cases they retain the right to vote, and 
its exercise abroad is often – but not always – facilitated by postal, proxy and 
e-voting. But democracy is so much more than the ballot box! Citizens who 
do not move can go on rallies, volunteer for various causes, join political 
organisations, speak in public or engage in community initiatives. One need 
not subscribe to Pierre Rosanvallon’s concept of counter- democracy3 to 
agree that all this is part and parcel of any democracy. Thus, on the more 
robust understanding of freedom, which encompasses equal opportunity for 
participation in the collective system of governance, free movement inevita-
bly reduces freedom. The fact that the mobile citizens have moved out freely 
may satisfy contractarians but not civic republicans. As long as the link with 
the home state is not broken completely – which may happen eventually – 
the freedom of the external citizens is limited in this sense.
1 A YouGov poll found that the intergenerational gap is immense ‘73 per cent of 
those aged between 18–29 want to remain in the EU, while 63 per cent of those 
aged over 60 want to leave’, The Telegraph, 12 May 2016, available at http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/21/
eu-referendum-who-in-britain-wants-to-leave-and-who-wants-to-rem/.
2 Some anecdotal evidence available in Paxman goes to Brussels: Who really 
rules us? BBC Documentary, first shown 19 May 2016, available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b07c6n58/
paxman-in-brussels-who-really-rules-us.
3 Rosanvallon, P. (2008), Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Now, this attenuated freedom might be normatively satisfactory as the 
stake of the external citizens in their country of origin is decreased, too.4 
And of course, along with the freedom to move, the EU citizens now have – 
uniquely – extensive rights to participate in the democratic governance of 
the EU itself, which remain unaffected by their movement. Further to this, 
from day one EU citizens have enjoyed significant rights to participate in the 
political process of the host state. Apart from the electoral franchise, the 
rights of participation they have there, albeit limited, roughly correspond to 
the rights which are difficult to exercise from a distance in the home state. It 
might appear that freedom – even republican freedom – lost equals freedom 
gained. The problem is that in practice the external citizens are far less likely 
to exercise the rights they have in the host state than they would exercise 
equivalent rights in their state of origin. While your ability to attend a rally 
ceases on the day you have left the country, it is highly unlikely that you 
would participate in another rally on the day you arrived in your new coun-
try of residence. Notwithstanding the legal rights the Treaties will give, 
there is an inevitable lag before a mobile citizen integrates in the political 
process of the host state to the degree he or she was integrated in the home 
state. For this period – and it can be very long – the mobile citizens are los-
ing a significant aspect of their freedom due to their movement.
This may all appear trivial. Indeed, reality rarely conforms fully to our 
normative expectations; even in the simplest case of national voting not 
every single citizen has effective and equal opportunity to vote and we are 
still satisfied when the overwhelming majority does. As long as only about 
15 (out of 508) million EU citizens5 have actually moved one may be right 
not to lose much sleep over the impact on democracy in the EU. The prob-
lem is one of aggregation. Republican freedom, and democracy in general, 
depend on a critical number of citizens who do participate actively in the 
political process. When fewer people participate – in voting and in the infor-
mal modes of contestation – the robustness of freedom decreases for all. 
Indeed, one of the main reasons for the democratic deficit of the EU is 
alleged to be the low turnout in elections for the European Parliament. This 
4 For a discussion see Bauböck, R. (2007), ‘Stakeholder Citizenship and 
Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External 
Voting’, Fordham L. Rev. 75 (5): 393–447.
5 Eurostat, see data available at
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_ 
migrant_population_statistics.
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is the darker side of free movement. Notwithstanding its apparent emancipa-
tory effect for the individual citizens – which may well outweigh what is lost 
in terms of non-participation – it tends to decrease, rather than increase 
republican freedom in Europe.
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